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Arms sales are extremely vital to the United States both in military support of its 
allies and in the defense industry. Arms sales have allowed our allies to attain relevant 
and current military equipment in support of their defense and coalition wars. This paper 
examines how arms sales, or, more concisely, Army foreign military sales (FMS), 
integrate within the Army’s domestic acquisition programs. Research explores what 
effect FMS has on the Army’s acquisition programs and on the U.S. defense industry. 
The findings in the research can be used to determine how the Army’s acquisition 
programs may utilize FMS programs more effectively, providing the most benefit to their 
acquisition program baseline.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PURPOSE OF STUDY 
While all U.S. Army acquisition program managers cite the importance of FMS in 
their program baselines, there is limited research available that focuses on the analysis of 
FMS in times of strong defense budgets, such as times of war versus budget-constrained 
times. The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the need for acquisition programs to 
aggressively include FMS in their programs during wartime funding increases and 
peacetime decreases. Program managers (PMs) will benefit from knowing how their 
particular programs can be stronger and less susceptible to funding peaks and valleys. 
The research within demonstrates the benefits of an aggressive FMS activity during all 
acquisition program funding cycles.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS, METHODOLOGY, AND THESIS 
STATEMENT 
This project addresses several primary and secondary research questions. The 
research questions are: 
• What are the totals of FMS expenditures in peacetime and wartime? 
• What is the amount of funding in relationship to the U.S. Army acquisition 
programs in both peacetime and wartime? 
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• What is the overall benefit to the U.S. defense industry when factoring in 
FMS? 
• Where is the PM focus during times of war and during times of peace or lower 
budgets? 
• What is the value to the PM when including FMS within his program during 
all stages of funding? 
To answer the research questions, this project uses both statistical analysis and 
case-study methodology. This approach provides an in-depth review of FMS programs 
and their relationship to U.S. Army acquisition programs. We utilized the case-study 
method as the most appropriate research strategy because it allows for analysis of 
multiple acquisition programs and adds real-life execution examples. Several data 
collection methods, such as program reviews, government and commercial reports, plus 
newspaper and periodical articles, were used to ensure a comprehensive analysis. 
Ultimately, this project suggests that program managers should aggressively seek 
FMS sales, regardless of whether the budget is enhanced or reduced. Managers should 
devote an international team to insure all is done to verify coalition partners’ 
requirements are filled as needed. Delivering the best capability to the warfighter on time 
and within budget will always be the number one priority for a PM, but incorporating 
FMS into the PM’s business model yields additional benefits to the American industrial 
base and the warfighter.  
C. LIMITATIONS 
The sensitivity of U.S. Army acquisition programs and their program managers 
created political issues; as such, the decision was made not to use personal interviews for 
this research. Data was gathered using only reliable and credible program sources. The 
reference materials from the programs identified in this report are from unclassified 
sources only. The classified data is insubstantial, and thus does not to skew the overall 
data in this report. Although FMS has a long history of execution, this report covers a 
ten-year span, from 2004 to 2014.  
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D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Following this introduction, Chapter II defines FMS through its program 
beginnings, program mission, and organizational structure within the United States 
government and how it is executed. Additionally, Chapter II illustrates the importance of 
FMS within the U.S. Army acquisition programs. Chapter III reviews the value of FMS 
in acquisition programs as they relate to the U.S. Army and to the United States industrial 
base. Chapter III statistically examines the value added, if any, of FMS and its statistical 
effect on the U.S. industrial base. Chapter IV evaluates the data in Chapter III, showing 
trends of the addition of FMS. Chapter IV provides a discussion of the data analysis. 
Chapter V concludes with report with overall conclusions, recommendations and areas 
for future research.  
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II. DESCRIPTION OF FMS AND ITS HISTORY 
A. FMS HISTORY 
The loosely defined beginnings of FMS can be traced back thousands of years. 
Over 2,500 years ago, in Thucydides’ “History of Peloponnesian War” (Defense 
Intstitute of Security Assistance Management [DISAM], 2015, pp. A2-1). We have proof 
of military equipment transfers from the time of Thucydides; almost all wars show 
evidence of military equipment or intelligence transfers from one country or clan to 
another. The transfer of equipment, training and intelligence to our allies has been a key 
part of our security strategy. We have transferred material to our allies or received from 
our allies in every war fought by the United States using various forms of transfer. As the 
United States began its effort for independence, we were on the receiving end of arms 
and advisors from France. Arms tactics and other support helped the United States 
become a nation (DISAM, 2015, pp. A2–1). 
1. World Wars I and II 
The United States shipped arms and equipment to the United Kingdom during 
World War I (WWI). Our ability to produce arms and equipment naturally found profit in 
becoming a major supplier of military material during this time while claiming to be a 
neutral country. “The United States exported $2.2 billion in war supplies to Europe. In 
1916, the U.S. shipped more than $1 billion of arms in a single year. By 1920, the U.S. 
accounted for more than 52 percent of global arms exports” (DISAM, 2015, pp. A2–3).   
The ability of the United States to produce military material with its industrial 
might was clearly something we leveraged to support our own political objectives and 
national security interest. Foreign military sales enabled the United States to help define 
the outcome of WWI in Europe.  “President Wilson saw this American output of 
munitions as ‘an arsenal of freedom.’ Nevertheless, despite that sentiment, the fact that 
the U.S. ranked high among the world’s leading arms exporters caused a great 
controversy that was reflected in much public debate and discussion throughout the 1920s 
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and 1930s” (Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM, 2015, pp. 
A2–3).  
Our leadership in Foreign Military Sales industry was not without its challenges. 
The debate would occur in Congress when Senator Gerald P. Nye (R-ND) established a 
committee specifically to evaluate the motive for the United States Industry to continue 
exporting arms.  “Greater government control and oversight over the U.S. arms industry was 
an outcome of the Nye Committee’s efforts. This included the establishment of a munitions 
control board” (DISAM, 2015, pp. A2–3). One might say this was the beginning of 
Congress regulating military and technology exports and the creation of export control 
laws began here (DISAM, 2015). 
Foreign military sales would again take the front line during World War II 
(WWII). The United States wanting to be neutral but understood the threat to national 
security as the Nationalsozialist (Nazi) party expanded Germany’s invasions of 
surrounding countries. Our commercial industry increased its arms production to support 
Britain and other Allies.   
The Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, was the principal means for 
providing U.S. military aid to foreign nations during World War II. The 
act authorized the president to transfer arms or any other defense materials 
for which Congress appropriated money to ‘the government of any 
country whose defense the president deems vital to the defense of the 
United States.’ Britain, the Soviet Union, China, Brazil, and many other 
countries received weapons under this law. (Foner & Garraty, 1991) 
This allowed for the lease and delivery of arms and supplies to U.S. Allies during the 
beginning of WWII. While the title states “Lend Lease,” most of the funds were not 
repaid. 
2. Truman Doctrine 
WWII ended with the United States policy in sharp contrast with the aggressive 
post war land holding policy exhibited by the Soviet Union. Many politicians felt time 
would cause the Soviet Union to relax their policy but international relationships took a 
turn for the worse just short of a decade after WWII.   
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In light of the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union and the 
appearance of Soviet meddling in Greek and Turkish affairs, the 
withdrawal of British assistance to Greece provided the necessary catalyst 
for the Truman Administration to reorient American foreign policy. 
Accordingly, in his speech, President Truman requested that Congress 
provide $400,000,000 worth of aid to both the Greek and Turkish 
Governments and support the dispatch of American civilian and military 
personnel and equipment to the region. (U.S. State Department Archive, 
2009)  
This also began the era for Military Assistance Organizations who would provide 
material and military advisors to manage these programs with nations receiving support 
assistance. This implementation of military advisors continues to be a tool to support our 
foreign policy and national security interests.   
Truman requested and received a request for $400 million to aid Greece and 
Turkey. This was the beginning for the United States Foreign Military Assistance as we 
would from this point forward work to influence the outcome of Soviet aggression by 
equipping and training allied or friendly nations to prevent the spread of communism. 
This request became known as the Truman doctrine, Truman declared:  
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
outside pressure. 
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies 
in their own way.  
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial 
aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.  
In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American 
civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of 
those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction and for the purpose 
of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be 
furnished, I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction 
and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel. (DISAM, 2015, pp. 
A2-5) 
Until this event, the U.S. had never engaged in formal military assistance during times 
other than war. Slow economic recovery in Europe brought needed United States 
financial assistance to those countries trying to rebuild. Ultimately this climate led to the 
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creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It provides a Military 
Alliance among its member countries. 
Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against 
them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, 
each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-
defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will 
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and 
in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of 
the North Atlantic area. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall 
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be 
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and security. (The North Atlantic 
Treaty, Washington DC, 4 Apr 1949, 2015) 
The importance of setting up the United States as a member of NATO reserved 
the right to help member nations defend themselves from threats should not be 
overlooked. Our historical actions related to military assistance from WWI, WWII, and 
the Cold War helped establish our nation a global super power.  
At the height of the Cold War, during the Truman Doctrine era, the Army 
worked with its allied nations and closest allies to protect themselves 
against current and future threats to their territory and internal security, 
working to strengthen regional and international security in a plan to 
contain the spread of communism. Army advisors worked around the 
world in China, Greece, Turkey, Korea, and South Vietnam in advisory 
groups or military groups. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of 
containment, the U.S. National Security Strategy reoriented to confront a 
wide range of more ambiguous threats. Consequently, the Army 
developed deeper relationships with partner security forces, such as those 
of Colombia, to help curtail drug production and buttress the friendly 
government’s campaign to defeat a violent insurgency. (United States 
Army, 2013, p. V) 
Mr. Michael McGarvey (a coauthor of this project) participated as a one of the 55 
military advisors working in the country of El Salvador beginning in 1983 through 1987. 
This military assistance program initiated to curtail the insurgency by guerrilla forces 
attempting to overthrow the government of El Salvador would have succeeded if not for 
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the intervention of the United States. Additionally, the advisory method allowed for 
minimal force exposure resulting in just a few causalities during the war from 1980 thru 
1992 and ultimately helped provide stability in the region. This effort was a good 
example of addressing national security concerns through Military Aid without engaging 
the full military force of the United States. 
B. CONTROL DOCUMENTS  
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon all followed Truman’s lead 
in supporting a containment policy against the Soviet Union through the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars with ever-increasing arms trade agreements. Aid included putting troops 
on the ground. Military Assistance or Army Trade became more formalized with the 
passing of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA) in 1976. AECA placed controls on arms transfers prohibiting interaction with 
countries found to have systemic human rights violations.  
C. FMS TODAY 
From an Army perspective, Field Manual (FM) 3-22 states, 
In order to meet the demands of a complex environment, Army forces 
require capacity and capability to prevent conflict and shape the security 
environment in partnership with joint and multinational forces. The Army 
provides enhanced security cooperation capabilities to support the 
combatant commander’s theater strategic objectives. These include 
building defense and security relationships and partner military capacity, 
gaining or maintaining access to secure populations, protecting 
infrastructure, and strengthening institutions. Achieving these common 
security interests contributes to preventing conflict and prevailing in war. 
(Department of the Army, 2013, p. vi) 
As budgets begin to decrease and we enter into another downsizing era, 
maintaining the defense industrial base will be a key political issue. According to an 
AL&T magazine article “Securing the Base” (Osborn, 2014, pp. 14–19), as the Army and 
DOD wrestle with fiscal priorities, one certainty to get congressional attention is how the 
DOD helps sustain the health of the U.S. defense industrial base. Methods such as 
multiyear procurements, Foreign Military Sales and industry outreach programs will 
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become essential. According to the Honorable Heidi Shyu, “Defense spending is 
projected to make up only 12 percent of the federal budget in FY17, down from 17 
percent in FY13. Those numbers are a world away from the 49 percent of the federal 
budget consumed by defense during the 1960s. At the same time, the budget for research, 
development and acquisitions (RDA) is declining faster than the overall defense budget” 
(Shyu, 2014, p. 5). 
The declining budget will have significant impact on our national security if not 
addressed. If a method to protect our defense industry is not resolved in the near term, 
Kris Osborn provides the following warning: “The United States is in danger of losing 
some key industrial capabilities that will be vital for our future national security. 
Insufficient near-term demand for certain products will keep some companies below their 
minimum economic sustaining rates, making it financially challenging to keep workers 
with unique, technical expertise active enough to maintain their proficiency in these 
advanced skills” (Osborn, 2014, p. 14). 
1. Who Controls FMS 
The Department of State is the agency to manage the U.S. security cooperation 
efforts through its different bureaus, offices, and overseas missions (Osborn, 2014). 
Security cooperation agencies conduct and coordinate activities throughout the combatant 
command through the theater army to build strong defense relationships. These efforts 
highlight U.S. security interests, develop our ally’s military capabilities for defense of 
their own nation and provide access by U.S. forces in times of need. In his article 
“Securing the Base,” Kris Osborn stated, “In its 2013 report to Congress on the health of 
the defense industrial base (IB), the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy notes DOD’s tightening fiscal constraints 
and widespread concern about their effects on the IB” (Osborn, 2014, p. 14).  
The policy office is focuses on industrial production capacity and the need to 
maintain a workforce with superior skills. Elana Broitman commented that to equip 
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warfighters we must have a healthy industrial base that continues to fund Research 
Development Test and Evaluation efforts (Osborn, 2014, p. 16). 
In the Department of Defense (DOD), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
(DSCA) takes the lead on all foreign assistance military programs. DSCA executes the 
DOD Security Assistance and Security Cooperation within the control of Department of 
Defense Directive 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security 
Cooperation, dated 24 October 2008 (Department of Defense, 2008). A direct quote from 
DSCA’s Security Assistance Manual defines security cooperation with assigned 
responsibilities:  
Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and 
enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve 
strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense 
and security establishments, including all DOD-administered security 
assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that 
promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international 
armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; 
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 
multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and 
contingency access to host nations. (Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency [DSCA], 2015, C1.1.1) 
The process for executing an FMS case within DOD is quite complex and routes 
through multiple offices along the way to approval and a formal FMS case. These 
processes are in place to insure all the correct actions are taken to insure we are selling 
the right system to the right customer which is sustainable now and into the future. The 
process also includes notification to Congress in larger FMS cases. Figure 1, FMS Case 
Life Cycle, shows the various steps needed after accepting a request from a customer on 
through the development of a Letter of Acceptance (LOA) and implementation of the 
LOA and case execution. Although the case is written by the Army for Army FMS cases, 
DOD and the Department of State are also involved in the process insuring the 
acceptability of the product (DISAM, 2015). 
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Figure 1.  FMS Case Life Cycle (from DCSA, 2006) 
2. Types of Security Assistance Programs 
There are seven major DOD programs used to execute security assistance 
authorized by the FAA or AECA (Department of the Army, 2013). The programs are 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Construction Services, Foreign Military 
Financing Program (FMFP), Military Assistance Programs, International Military 
Education and Training, Leases, Presidential Drawdowns and Excess Defense Articles. 
FMS is the main program that other programs execute under in terms of funding and 
execution (Department of the Army, 2013). 
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3. How is FMS Executed within the U.S. Army 
The U.S. Army supports combatant commanders with U.S. Army Foreign Area 
Officers who work within Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) at U.S. Embassies 
around the world. The SCOs are military assistance advisory groups, military missions 
and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense 
attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions 
(Department of the Army, 2013). Figure 2, Security Cooperation Ends, Ways, and Means 
Framework, shows the detail and depth of the U.S. Army Security Cooperation Programs. 
 
Figure 2.  Security Cooperation Ends, Ways, and Means Framework (from 
Department of the Army, 2013) 
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4. Technology Transfer Issues with FMS Programs 
The execution and planning of an international program can be a difficult 
endeavor, as shown in Figure 2, providing an overview of the ends, ways and means 
framework for security cooperation. Technology transfer issues are handled differently 
by each service. These issues include but are not limited to questions such as: 
• Does the program have a current security classification guide? If not, is the 
security manager engaged and working it as a priority? 
• What is the Critical Program Information (CPI) for this program, and how will we 
protect it? 
• What is the feasibility of international participation, and who are the likely 
players? 
• What kinds of technology transfers/disclosures are envisioned, and what is the 
timing? Who needs to approve the releases and when? 
• What Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) is associated with this program? 
Have we established procedures to protect the CUI? 
• Is the cognizant Foreign Disclosure Office aware of our planning/actions, and is it 
engaged in developing a Delegation of Disclosure authority Letter to enable 
timely release decisions? (Schultz, 2013) 
The top priority of the decision to move toward including international 
participation in the acquisition process must include responses from the above questions 
Brian Schultz penned in his 2013 Defense AT&L article. Identify program CPI in the 
beginning of a program driving the appropriate protection documents and plans. All 
complete acquisition program must have a valid program protection plan (PPP), security 
classification guide (SCG) and technology assessment/control plan (TA/CP) for domestic 
and international purposes (Schultz, 2013). 
In today’s acquisition programs, the prime contractor’s supply chain is normally 
many layers deep. This depth leads to components procured from sources outside the 
United States to evaluate a program’s supply chain for sources, which may pose a threat 
to the United States now or in the future. The evaluation is the backbone for developing 
the program protection plan and sound program protection planning (Schultz, 2013). 
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The use of commercial off the shelf (COTS) components in the acquisition 
program of today pose a threat. It is difficult to dig deep into some COTS components 
supply chain. Acquisition program must work hard effectively blocking attacks from U.S. 
adversaries. Market studies reveal other sources of the main component and its 
subcomponents.   
5. Monetary Value of Military Assistance Programs Today 
Today the Army has many acquisition programs providing access to Foreign 
Military Sales to support strategic partnerships around the world. The funding providing 
Military Assistance is significant and presents a real opportunity for the U.S. defense 
industry. Total military Assistance in FY2010 was $15.1 billion with increases for both 
FY2011 and FY2012 over the FY2010 base as shown in Table 1, Total Military 
Assistance in U.S. Funding from FY2010–FY2012 (USAID, n.d.).   
Table 1.   Total Military Assistance in U.S. Funding from FY2010–FY2012 
(from USAID, 2014) 
 
 
One of the United States’ arms transfer banner year to date has been in 2011. As 
stated by Grimmett and Kerr:   
In 2011, the United States led in arms transfer agreements worldwide, 
making agreements valued at $66.3 billion (77.7% of all such 
agreements), an extraordinary increase from $21.4 billion in 2010. The 
United States worldwide agreements total for 2011 is the largest for a 
single year in the history of the U.S. arms export program. (2012) 
6. U.S. Defense Industry Importance 
Table 2, U.S. Army and FMS Procurement, shows the volume of FMS sales 
compared to Army procurements demonstrating the positive influence FMS has on the 
Army. It is a positive influence as many FMS programs help fund technology 
advancements in the next generation of a product. 
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Table 2.   U.S. Army and FMS Procurement (after Moore, 2016)  
 
 
A strong, responsive industrial base is the foundation for our national security and 
enables the PM to leverage innovative technologies and cutting-edge capabilities to 
provide the best warfighting tools for our military. The industrial base is critical to 
keeping the United States one step ahead of its adversaries, benefiting both the PM and 
the defense contractors. These benefits stand out during periods of high budget outlays as 
evidenced during the post-9/11 Iraq and Afghanistan operations surge from 2002 to the 
present. However, the defense industrial base is entering a period of declining domestic 
military spending as we return to peacetime budgets.  
Overall DOD total obligation authority (TOA) is declining, as evidence in Figure 
3, Timeline of U.S. Defense Budget History, shows. The decline is from a high of $644 
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billion to just over $500 billion (Heritage Foundation, 2015). Fiscal realities of 
maintaining near term readiness necessitate changes in Acquisition investment strategies. 
At the same time, we must balance near term readiness vs. desired future capabilities 
while predicting where the next crisis will erupt. PMs must ensure that their funding and 
schedule are harmonious and need to leverage foreign military sales to protect the 
industrial base during the peacetime years as available funding declines. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Timeline of U.S. Defense Budget History (after Heritage 
Foundation, 2015) 
Take for example the ongoing saga of the Army’s subsidy of the Tracked 
Wheeled Vehicle (TWV), which saw a dramatic production increase in response to the 
operational demands and threats experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the GAO-12-
859 report to Congress on the industrial base, U.S. tactical wheeled vehicle manufactures 
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were shown to face a period of uncertainty as DOD purchases decline and FMS sales 
remain flat (GAO, 2012). GAO depicted the strong reliance on the seven manufactures of 
TWV industrial base have on the defense budget. As the defense budget decreases and 
the current movement of the military to sell used TMV vehicles to our coalition partners 
continues, these actions further exacerbate financial uncertainty. However, does that 
mean we should keep a production line when we already have excess quantity? How can 
we afford to do this in light of shrinking RDA budgets and limited funding to rapidly 
develop and field critical new products to the warfighter? You can replace people but you 
can’t replace the brain power that comes with years of experience (GAO, 2012). 
During the downswing after post conflict engagement, the industrial base appears 
to be more vulnerable to loss of key workforce skills. In fact, as highlighted in the myriad 
of industrial base articles in the Jan-Mar 2014 Army Acquisition and Logistics Magazine, 
many essential capabilities and workforce skills that are crucial to our Soldiers’ decisive 
edge over our enemies could disappear unless we do something to protect them 
(USAASC, 2014). The issue at hand in facing fiscal year 2016 is the preservation of the 
most essential of the highly specialized capabilities during an austere budget 
environment. While budgets may not allow for the procurement of new weapons for our 
own military at the rate many would like, we need to maintain the ability to ramp up for a 
future conflict. One way to preserve our domestic industrial base is to promote the sale of 
our defense materiel to friendly nations who may very well be allies in the next conflict. 
That is where FMS comes into play (USASAC, 2014). 
TOA for the U.S. Army is set to decline 17 percent from Fiscal Year 2012 to 
Fiscal Year 2016 (Harned, 2014). Figure 4, Declining RDA TOA, shows this decline 
triggered by sequestration. Decreasing and leveling defense budgets create a significant 
void in profitability and sustainment of the U.S. defense companies. This is a major 
concern with U.S. government organizations to sustain the domestic defense industrial 
base (Center for Strategic & International Studies [CSCI], 2013). 
 19 
 
Figure 4.  Declining RDA TOA 
(after Harned, 2014) 
Along with the shrinking defense budget, RDA in FY14 was $23.5 billion. That is 
down over 28 percent from FY12 RDA budget of $33.2 billion (Shyu, 2014). The U.S. 
defense industry, as with any business, needs to sustain and grow its revenue generating 
function or they will go out of business. As the defense budget shrinks these companies 
need another source of revenue to remain viable and ready to support U.S. demands when 
the defense budget begins to turn upward. With the near term defense budget under threat 
of sequestration and stable acquisition program funding lines, the defense industry needs 
to find the means to continue company growth opportunities.  
There is a hidden danger in relying solely on FMS as budgets dwindle and 
defense contractors seek other opportunities to meet stockholders equities. While some 
defense companies look across other Service branches such as Homeland Security or the 
State Department, companies are compelled to diversify the industry base by competing 
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for FMS cases. The PM office and the defense industry must leverage FMS to garner 
price breaks and reinvest those dollars into technological advancement. If we do not and 
just wait until the next crisis, other countries will be more than willing to take our place 
in the large FMS trade (e.g., France [Airbus]) or more rapidly respond to customer needs 
than the cumbersome U.S. FMS process. Sometimes FMS can help keep the production 
lines open; however, our foreign allies generally want the most recent piece of equipment 
that they have become aware of, whether during observation in conflict with our soldiers 
or by other means. The foreign countries generally do not want the prior generation of 
anything and that is where the delicate balancing act of protecting the U.S. interests while 
sustaining the industrial base. If there is a bona fide need for a system, such as aircraft or 
protection devices, sell the past generation, learn and retool and use the savings for 
reinvestment into the next generation enhancements. One caution - we should not sustain 
certain aspects of the industrial base just for congressional interest.  
The Army has not been successful in conveying actual combatant needs vs 
congressional special interest in maintaining their respective state industrial base. Table 3 
is relevant as it depicts how much power Congress and the industrial base has in 
purchasing power for TWW purchases the Army does not need. Instead of using those 
dollars for development of critical material solutions and exploitation of newer 
technology for emerging global combats, Congress mandated dollars to continue funding 
TWW that did not meet a critical Army capability gap. 
For many years, the Army has been vocal in stating to Congress that they do not 
need any more tanks according to an article on Military.com (Cox, 2015). In fact, the 
Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno has criticized the congressional mandated add-
ons for tanks the army did not need nor afford. The 2012 defense appropriations bill 
added $255 million for 42 tanks. Congressional lawmakers have always prevailed and 
now according to a National Defense article, “Army Changes Course on Tank 
Production” (Erwin, 2015), shows Congress has continued in protecting jobs and the 
industrial base facilities in Ohio and Alabama, where heavy combat vehicles are 
produced and refurbished. The Army had always maintained that foreign military sales 
would keep the industrial base afloat until the Army was ready to procure the next 
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generation of tanks in 2019. Congress disagreed with the Army’s vision of foreign 
military sales to bridge the industrial bridge gap and added $120 million for the M1 
Abrams tank upgrades and $128 million for Stryker and Bradley work. One of Sen. John 
McCain, Senate Armed Services Committee chairman, top priorities for the upcoming 
budget cycle is to ensure strong service chief involvement. The Army has acquiesced and 
decided to stop fighting Congress. The Army is asking Congress to approve $367 million 
in 2016 for upgrades for main battle tanks primarily in the form of engineering change 
proposals to enhance the Stryker with larger double-V hull to protect vehicles from 
buried bombs. The change perhaps can be attributed to the assumption Army leaders had 
that foreign customer orders would keep the Lima, Ohio plant financially viable until 
2019 which is operated by the Abrams manufacturer General Dynamics Land Systems. 
The question still remains if this concession by the Army will be enough to satisfy 
Congress. The Services agree that the current funding posture is not sufficient to meet 
strategic missions under the National Defense Strategy (NDS). That will win the next war 
which most likely will not be ground combat but more the realm of cyber and close hand 
combat, protect the home front and adjust for sequestration cuts. 
7. Monetary Value of Army FMS Today 
It is obvious from Table 3, Army Foreign Military Sales in Billions of Dollars, 
FMS sales have doubled in the just the past 10 years. There are years during the 2004–
2014-time period in which sales where sales have tripled such as the 2009–2011 period. 
The 2009–2010 period includes some very big procurements like the $10B United Arab 








Challenges facing the U.S. defense industry were discussed by the panel put on by 
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) (Mehta, 2014), for export reforms. Ken 
Handelman, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls in the State 
Department’s Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, Kevin Wolf, Assistant Secretary 
for Export Administration at the Commerce Department and Beth McCormick, Director 
of the Pentagon’s Defense Technology Security Administration all spoke of the 
importance of security assistance in support of our defense industry (Mehta, 2014). 
The participants in the panel exert final control over many decisions for export 
items from our U.S. industries. Their presence at the AIA demonstrated the importance of 
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this issue. “We have tried to show our face here so we’re not ‘these horrible people who 
control technology,’” McCormick said, adding, “We have started to have a presence by 
our agencies at these kind of international events, and started doing so about a year ago.” 
McCormick added that the “face-to-face” interaction with the international community at 
these events is helpful (Mehta, 2014). 
Industry members asked the trio questions about how reform efforts were 
advancing and old agreements that restrict the sale of unmanned systems. “There will be 
a lot to say in due course that is very helpful to exporters and also to our allies who have 
been hoping to take advantage of the very good technology U.S. companies produce, but 
right now that process is still internal to the U.S. government,” Handelman said. “We 
have listened to that, we know it is important for industry to hear that, but please stay 
tuned” (Mehta, 2014). 
While waiting for reforms market share migrates to foreign industry. “We have a 
tendency to wait until the market is half gone before the bureaucracy finally understands 
that the horse is not only out of the barn, but someone else is riding it,” said Joel Johnson 
of the Teal Group (Mehta, 2014). 
The U.S. defense and commercial industries need details and soon. Frank 
Kendall, the Pentagon’s acquisition chief stated: 
In general, they would like clarity about what we are able to do with them. 
They like a responsive system that acknowledges their need and gives 
them answers to the questions they have. The thing I hear very often is 
they think the U.S. has top-quality systems, and business deals with the 
U.S., when in place, are executed as planned, and the U.S. does a very 
good job fielding the systems. There are a lot of things that are attractive 
about U.S. products to allies and I hear that very consistently. The 
message I am trying to communicate [is] that the U.S. is standing behind 
the products that are offered….International customers continue to buy 
U.S. military equipment, many are shifting toward foreign sources with 
less cumbersome sales processes. (Mehta, 2014) 
Kendall said: 
The message I’m getting is there is a high demand for those products, 
[but] people want to see us do a more expeditious process of getting their 
requests resolved. The international market may be fertile, but U.S. 
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companies may find challenges expanding their business there—even with 
a full-court press from government leaders….I think it is always wise to 
remember that foreign markets don’t expand because U.S. and E.U. 
manufacturers need them to….Markets for defense products, like all 
others, depend on two things: needs and resources to meet those needs. In 
every U.S. build-down I’ve seen, the combined “capture goals” of the U.S. 
companies invariably exceeds total foreign demand. (Mehta, 2014) 
Table 4, FMS Cases and Value in billions, shows the value of FMS supported by 
each service and some agencies is significant. These dollars are critical to sustaining the 
U.S. defense industry.  
Table 4.   FMS Cases and Value in Billions of Dollars (from Grover, 2012) 
 
There are two ways the U.S. defense industry can grow their business, Direct 
Commercial Sales (DCM) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). There are several benefits 
to using the FMS method for the foreign government. Table 5, Foreign Military Sales 




Table 5.   Foreign Military Sales versus Direct Commercial Sales (from 
LMDefense, n.d.)  
  Foreign Military Sales Direct Commercial Sales 
Nature of 
Relationship 
The U.S. DOD will negotiate 
with the Customer on behalf of 
the Vendor. 





The U.S. DOD assumes 
contracting risk and is 
responsible for ensuring that the 
Vendor meets cost, schedule, 
and performance requirements. 
The U.S. DOD guarantees 
payment by the Customer. 
U.S. Government (USG) is not 
involved in the transaction, and does 
not act on behalf of the Customer or 
Vendor should complications arise. 
Export Licenses This is a government-to-
government transfer, so the 
export process is managed by 
the U.S. DOD. No involvement 
by the Vendor is required. 
The Vendor must obtain export 
approval from the U.S. State 
Department. The Vendor is 




Any required notifications to 
Congress are jointly sponsored 
by the U.S. DOD and the State 
Department. 
Congress must be notified by the 
State Department of a decision to 
issue an export license if the sale 
includes significant defense 
equipment valued at $14 million or 
more. (Basically, both DCS and FMS 
require the same type of notification) 
Contract Issues U.S. DOD procures the defense 
articles under the same 
The Vendor negotiates with the 
Customer. The Customer assumes 
 26 
  Foreign Military Sales Direct Commercial Sales 
contractual provisions used for 
all DOD procurement. The 
Customer pays an additional 
3.5% of the total price to cover 
the contracting and 
administrative services provided 
by U.S. DOD. 
management responsibility. These 
activities represent overhead 
management costs to the Customer. 
The size and skill of the Customer 
contracting staff may be a limiting 
factor during procurement. 
Cash Flow 
Requirements 
The initial deposit required is 
usually somewhat lower than 
commercial contract down 
payments. This facilitates 
payment by the Customer. 
Direct commercial contracts 
generally require a relatively large 
down payment, payable at the time 
of contract signature. This may 






U.S. financial assistance, 
through the Foreign Military 
Financing Program (FMF) may 
be available to the Customer. If 
FMF funds are available, they 
must be processed through FMS 
(except for the ten countries 
granted an exception). 
If the Customer wishes to use FMF 
funding, DCS is not an option. Ten 
countries are granted an exception 
that allows them to use FMF funding 
to pay for DCS contracts: Israel, 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Portugal, Pakistan, Yemen, 
and Greece. 
Notes and abbreviations: U.S. DOD refers to any U.S. military office. There are various DOD offices 
involved in the FMS process; Vendor refers to the U.S. defense company seeking to sell their product 
overseas; Customer refers to the Foreign Government purchaser of the U.S. defense products. 
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8. Leveraging FMS 
When industry leverages FMS the Security Cooperation Agency manages the 
licenses and Congressional notifications when required. The DOD will work with the 
customer and make sure the provider gets paid. This increases the success of the various 
companies.  
FMS is a little known yet dynamic process that pays big dividends for the 
U.S. government and our international partners. From the industrial 
standpoint, billions of dollars are invested annually in the U.S. economy 
through the FMS process. From the PM standpoint, it provides a way to 
accelerate enhancements and capabilities through the infusion of funds. 
For the pilot in the cockpit, the enhancements on the aircraft directly affect 
warfighting capabilities. (Williams, 2015) 
The benefits to the U.S. defense industry base is clear. What is also clear is the 
benefit to the DOD and Army for sharing the acquisition of enhanced capabilities using 
the FMS investment of funds. Economies of scale can be achieved by bulk purchases 
thereby reducing the total cost per end item for the DOD and the foreign partner (U.S. 
Army G3/G7, 2010). According to Brigadier General Tucker, Commander, Security 
Assistance Command, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama:  
The highest was FY 2009, when we had $24.2 billion in foreign military 
sales. We had a couple of very high value cases that year. One of those 
was the Patriot sale of more than $6 billion in value. That was the single 
largest FMS case by a [Security Assistance Management Directorate] and 
it was [Aviation and Missile Command (Army)’s Security Assistance 
Management Directorate (Army] )that supported it. (Hawkins, 2010) 
BG Tucker stated in his briefing, “New Army FMS in fiscal year (FY) 2010 
totaled $14.6 billion spread across 701 new cases, 462 modifications, and 1017 
amendments. This increased OPTEMPO is representative of a trend over the last several 
years, as evidence by a total of $62 billion in Army FMS from FY07 to FY10; the four-
year period immediately prior saw only $18 billion in FMS” (U.S. Army G3/G7, 2010). 
As BG Tucker has shown thorough the dramatic increase in FMS over the past fiscal 
years, FMS is an essential part of acquisitions.  
Those figures should continue upward as the interest in purchasing Army 
capabilities continues among the nation’s international partners and 
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partner nations continue in a good financial posture. True to that trend, 
recently DOD announced notification of $60 billion in potential sales to 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. USASAC has about 350 employees 
currently managing about 4,600 FMS cases valued at more than $69 
billion. (Hawkins, 2010) 
There is sufficient evidence supporting the continued effort to develop 
international partnerships. The value to the U.S. Industrial Base, the Army and the United 
States certainly supports this effort.  
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III. FMS VALUE IN ARMY ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
The majority of new programs or new orders for the M1 tank for example in 2015 
are coming from foreign military sales, currently the largest customer is Saudi Arabia 
with a total of 66 billion (Defense Industry Daily Staff, 2013). It is clear at this point in 
time that from 2013 to 2015 there has been a drastic increase in foreign military sales of 
Army acquisition programs. The increase in FMS clearly shows the United States foreign 
policy is supporting one of its primary objectives. To ensure that its allies and partners 
are able to fully participate in coalition efforts to defeat terrorism and terrorist 
organizations around the globe. Figure 5, M1A2 Unloading from C17, shows the massive 
M1A2 tank being offloaded on foreign soil.   
 
Figure 5.  M1A2 Unloading from C17 (from Gordon, 2015) 
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Some of the benefits of foreign military sales is a transfer of newer technologies 
to our outlying coalition partners. This enhances coalition force operation and potential 
use of supply lines across international organizations. Improving the technology of our 
allies and coalition partners supports United States national defense priorities and 
national security interest.  
Major international sales have helped to sustain production of a number of 
Army programs in recent years, including the Apache, the CH-47 Chinook 
helicopters, the Patriot missile system, Excalibur 155mm precision-guided 
artillery shells, and the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and 
Javelin anti-tank missiles. (Murawski & Mewett, 2014) 
As a project manager, the ability to insert new technology that has already 
reached readiness level is limited by available funds. Those dollars that are in the 
approved appropriation for a weapon system are mission dollars. The benefit of FMS is 
the infusion of additional funds outside of the usual appropriations for that system which 
may allow a PM to bring new technology and upgrades into a system sooner. The Army 
CH-47 program leveraged proceeds with remanufacturing dollars to procure the new CH-
47Fs at no additional cost to the Army or DOD. This methodology could be utilized by 
many Army efforts to reduce the cost of technology insertion into various products. The 
U.S. forces and foreign nation utilizing the weapon system will benefit. An additional 
benefit is the ability to interoperate when executing military actions as part of a coalition.  
The issue of establishing partnerships and supporting Foreign Military Sales has 
not escaped top leadership. 
The Army is taking a proactive approach to ensure the preservation of 
those critical and essential capabilities needed for future short-and long-
term operations. In order to identify the risk and issues impacting the 
industrial base, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (OASA(ALT)) has established 
collaborative efforts with major players such as the Office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Logistics 
Agency and the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Defense Contract 
Management Agency. (Millan, 2014) 
The PM works to include FMS within their programs from program inception on through 
initial deliveries.   
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A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. ARMY/MARINES VERSUS FMS 
TOW AND JAVELIN PROCUREMENTS  
1. TOW Procurement Analysis 
Table 6, U.S. Army and FMS TOW Missile Procurements, illustrates the U.S. 
Army and Marine’s TOW Missile procurements alongside TOW FMS sales from the 
same time period. Data shows the U.S. procurements equal to or ahead of FMS for 5 of 
the 9 years in this table. FMS procurements outpace U.S. in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2014. 
The FMS sales from 2008–2010 depict a time when CENTCOM forces began planning 
for the pull out of Iraq and Afghanistan. The high sales in 2014 for FMS is a direct result 
of increased coalition partners’ requirements as they respond to the most recent threat of 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or (ISIS) and the return of Taliban forces in 
the CENTCOM AOR.  
Table 6.   U.S. Army and FMS TOW Missile Procurements 
(after USASAC, 2014) 
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These numbers in the table represent a coalition of foreign countries beginning to 
realize they are soon going to be alone in their struggle in the Middle East against ISIS 
and the Taliban. FMS procurements spike during these times which offset the reductions 
in U.S. Army and Marine TOW procurements as our forces use less Anti-Tank Missiles 
in combat actions. 
2. Javelin Missile and Command Launch Unit (CLU) Analysis 
U.S. Army and Marine procurements from 2006–2010 begin to rise dramatically 
for the Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) system as our commanders continue 
preparations to fight in an asymmetric battlefield. The Asymmetric Battlefield is where a 
Javelin is used at its best. The Javelin is used where enemy forces are all around friendly 
forces. A battle where special military operators are working to defeat pockets of 
resistance. 
Table 7, U.S. Army and FMS Javelin Missile/CLU Procurements, illustrates sales 
on a constant rise from 2009 to 2014 as our coalition forces plan to take the fight to the 
insurgents and the ISIS threat as the U.S. forces begin their withdrawal from the 
CENCTOM AOR. This table illustrates as U.S. procurements fall off from recent highs 
during the peaks of war like “the surge” our coalition forces increase their procurements.  
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B. U.S. PROCUREMENTS VERSUS FMS PROCUREMENTS OF LIKE 
SYSTEMS 
1. Procurement Data Demonstrates the Needs of Our Coalition Partners 
Table 7, U.S. Army and FMS Javelin Missile/CLU Procurements, also 
demonstrates how FMS sales ramp up when U.S. Forces begin their retrograde actions 
from the AOR. There are reasons for increased requirement for U.S. weapons. 
1. FMS customers have seen our weapons in action first hand and know their 
capabilities.  
2. Coalition Partners/FMS customers realize they are soon to be alone coping 
with insurgents and groups like the Taliban or ISIS. They know without 
similar weapons used to beat back the enemy when the U.S. Forces were 
there they will have little success in defending their borders and cities 
from attack and take over.  
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2. Program Manager’s Focus in Times of War 
PM efforts are focused heavily on U.S. procurements in times of war. The PM is 
extremely busy executing the procurement actions he has been funded for. The PM is 
also very busy pushing and managing the defense industry to meet their projected 
schedules on time and within budget. The PM’s eye is constantly on meeting the 
requirements of the U.S. warfighters and executing the U.S. taxpayer funding provided to 
him from Congress.  
This is the time when the PM must also concentrate efforts with the FMS 
customer by providing briefings to U.S. Forces Commanders in the AOR. The local U.S. 
Forces Commanders can provide positive assistance with the foreign coalition forces 
providing them capabilities information, aiding the coalition procurement officials with 
the information needed for their procurement processes.  
Table 8, Total Defense Drawdowns Post-War, depict how fast times of relatively 
high budgets fade. The PM cannot wait for the quick drop in procurement funds but 
instead be planning for it since history shows it is a given to occur.  
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Table 8.   Total Defense Drawdowns Post-War (from CSCI, 2013) 
 
 
3. Increased FMS Sales Equals Exponential Gains 
The increased procurement of new FMS procurements allows the PM to have 
more flexibility and control over program deliveries. FMS additions to U.S. procurements 
allow the Prime Contractors the ability to secure longer, lower priced contracts with their 
suppliers. This provides benefit at all levels of production when producing a complex 
weapon system. Suppliers experience times of security allowing them to hone their 
production processes. Suppliers work constantly increasing production capability 
allowing them to work through and mitigate obsolescence issues with their components.  
FMS is a constant value to a U.S. Army Acquisition Program if properly planned 
for and executed. Our coalition partners and foreign customers will not always procure 
their U.S. military equipment at the exact right time needed to insure seamless contract 
and production operations. The PM does not have control over FMS customer budget and 
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acquisition cycles. Because of the gains related to FMS sales the PM should always keep 





IV. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FURTHER
RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Program Managers need to be engaged early and often to support FMS 
It is clear the PM’s Impact to Foreign Military Sales early in the process is 
beneficial to the success of the program. PMs bring a full understanding of production 
schedules, contracts and priorities associated with deliveries. They must be careful to not 
cross ethical lines while supporting our partner nations understanding of a product. They 
must not be salesmen for the item but rather the lead U.S. government advocate 
demonstrating confidence in the product. It is a difficult line to walk but one from which 
the PM cannot stray.  
PM tools to help coordinate FMS actions 
The PM has the contractual and production knowledge at his fingertips and can 
present this to any cleared customer for their review and initial planning. The more 
countries a PM can brief his program to, the more possible customers he is likely to gain. 
He can coordinate these briefings through the Offices of Military Cooperation (OMC) 
and Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC), which are normally located within the host 
nations U.S. Embassy. Through coordination with the entire Security Assistance 
Enterprise, the OMCs or ODCs the PM can gain access to the correct officials within the 
host nation with the power to make acquisition decisions.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Essential and detailed guidance needs to be provided to the PMs so they clearly 
understand their lead role in FMS. The PM must understand, through data demonstration, 
how FMS can and will add positively to his acquisition program. FMS must be taken 
from a support part of the PM’s Acquisition Program to an essential part with associate 
milestones.  
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Education program to ensure Army acquisition professionals understand the 
complete benefits FMS brings to the Nation, the U.S. industrial base, international 
relationships, coalition interoperability and strengthening military-to-military ties. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH RECOMMENDED 
Our research team focused our research on FMS as it pertains to the U.S. Army 
because we all work for the Army. We suggest a multi-service research team extend our 
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